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In a recent series of exchanges, Mattias Kumm argued for the existence of a legal duty of the European Council
to nominate the Spitzenkandidat for the presidency of the Commission, whereas Kenneth Armstrong denied the
existence of such a duty under EU law. In the following text I am going to argue that the existence of a legal duty
is the wrong question to address. Instead, we should answer two other questions: (1) whether we should wish
the nomination of the Spitzenkandidat, (2) whether there are procedural possibilities to enforce such a wish.
Both of my answers to these two questions will be in the affirmative, thus turning the Kumm–Armstrong debate
into an ontological exercise.
The two main reasons why democracy won the contest for the leading legitimacy claim in the modern world are
its capacity to generate loyalty and its self-correction potential. Citizens must have the feeling that they have a
decisive say in order to build up their loyalty towards the political community and they should also be able decide
about who is leading their government so they can correct policies by new personal choices. Thus, if we want
the EU to use democracy’s virtues of generating loyalty and self-correction, then the European Commission
(conceptualised as the government of the EU) should be elected solely by the European Parliament. If this is not
the case, then – as Kumm rightly put it – it is quite difficult to explain voters what the purpose of them going to
the ballot was (and will be in the future) at all. Any choice which would be different from the original
Spitzenkandidat would be a slap in the face for the European electorate and would make Eurosceptic voices
more plausible than ever. It is very difficult to argue (leaving aside the existence of a legal duty to do so, at least
for now) that it would not be highly desirable to have the Spitzenkandidat as the next Commission president if we
do not want to dramatically erode the democratic credit of the EU.
According to Armstrong, a modification of the treaties would be inevitable in order to force the European Council
to accept this. As I have previously argued, this approach is wrong: the mere black letter legal situation is not
always decisive if we want to know whether we have a parliamentary regime or not. If we have a look at the
U.K., there is currently (and there was) no legal rule prescribing that the monarch has to appoint as Prime
Minister the person who commands the majority support of the House of Commons. It is happening though, by a
(legally non-binding) constitutional convention.
This is exactly what we need now in the EU. The election of the Commission president should depend on which
MEP faction(s) have the most seats, and who they (in coalition) want to see in the seat of the Commission
president. But how can the European Council be forced adopt such a practice? Simply accusing the members of
the Council of antidemocratic behaviour can probably not force them, as they would refer to the text of TEU
which – as Armstrong rightly pointed out – actually favours a non-parliamentary solution. So the solution would
simply be, that the European Parliament by using its veto possibilities (or to put it more bluntly: blackmailing
capacity) only accepts the one person as candidate by the European Council whom the majority of the European
Parliament supports. All other candidates will be refused. And, of course, the same logic applies for the members
of the Commission.
This logic is not unknown to the EU institutions: Before Mr. Barroso became the President of the Commission for
the first time (2004), the European Council intended to propose a person from the political left, even though the
elections to the European Parliament had been won by the political right. The European Parliament vetoed the
idea, and the European Council had to choose someone from the political right. It would only be one further step
in the same direction (an important and big step though), if the European Parliament managed to do what they
are currently doing, i.e. that they will accept only one particular person for that position. In 2004, a second event
during the formation of the European Commission also showed that the European Parliament has the strength to
substantially influence the composition of the Commission: criticism from the European Parliament on one of the
commissioner candidates (Rocco Buttiglione) led Barroso to change its membership and to alter the distribution
of portfolios. But what was missing until now is the EU electorate knowing before the European Parliament
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elections the Spitzenkandidats, so they can choose their parties in light of this. Until now. The conflict driven
situation today in which we have a Spitzenkandidat who was already announced well before the elections and a
reluctant European Council is exactly what, for a long time, I was hoping for: who has the final say on the issue
can now be clarified.
It is unlikely that anyone would be ready to risk being blamed for substantively delaying the establishment of a
new Commission by initiating a court procedure, thus it is very unlikely that this institutional question will ever
reach the Court, and even if it did reach the Court it would be suicidal for the EU as a whole and also opposing
all former democratising and parliamentarising tendencies in case law for the Court to deny the Parliament this
privilege.
We can achieve a parliamentary system under the current EU legal regime, if politicians in the European
Parliament have the ambition to take the necessary steps. If this happened, then the EU government system
would become similar to some extent to today’s German system, where a party coalition in the lower chamber
supports the government, and the upper chamber takes part substantively only in the legislative process but not
in the formation of the government.
If the EU becomes a parliamentary system as I just described above, then it will only be an academic question
whether it follows from the treaties as a legal duty or whether it is just political reality and non-legal constitutional
convention which were merely allowed by the legal rules. Thus the debate between Armstrong and Kumm
becomes a purely ontological question about the nature of certain rules.
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